Michael Kuhn – Arguing about theories and political opinions

What states of citizen societies reveal with their war propaganda and with their wars about their raison d’état  

Why human-despising political goals can only be justified with arguments that cannot be surpassed in stupidity can currently be studied in the war propaganda of warring states. In the best argumentative harmony, Russia and the West with its Ukrainian warriors accuse each other of exactly the same thing in order to convince their respective populations to wage war against the other. As if in a war it is always only the enemy state that shoots the soldiers of its own state, in the state war propaganda the whole human-despising cruelty of targeted killing is always held up to the other side, as if the soldiers of the other side shot down by their own soldiers were not exactly the same deaths by exactly the same brutality of their own soldiers, brutal slaughter of people who have nothing whatsoever to do with each other in their private lives, ordered on both sides by the top political leaders of these states. 

Nothing is more self-evident to the political leaders of these states on both sides of their conflict than that one side, here responding to the refusal of the West to respect its state, Russia, as a world power, and the refusal on the other, that of the states of the West, to do so, should be enforced with a war, which the side attacked with war, the West, then responds with war, the systematic killing that both accuse each other of as proof of their brutal political aims, which both enforce with the brutality that characterises the kind of clash of interests between such states not only in war.  

The cynicism governing these political leaders of such states on both sides to consider the slaughter of its citizens in war, of all things, as an argument for their state and its war against another, agitating it‘s own citizens with exactly the same brutal cynicism for victory in war over the other state, this cynicism reveals a lot about what the raison d’état   is, about how these states see their citizens and how they try to win them over for their violent aims. 

That wars must only be answered with war, nothing is more self-evident to the politicians of these political powers of citizen societies. The idea that they spread by denouncing the acts of violence of the other side, that they themselves are against this violence, that this is a very puposefully constructed misunderstanding, they prove not only by mobilising the same violence and by holding it up as the only correct answer to war to every objection, however cautious this might be, if it only wants to see the extent of warlike counter-violence discussed, it is denounced as propaganda of the other side, in this case Russia, thus rejecting any relativation of their warlike answer to war. That the presentation of their decision to respond to war with war is then again only a reluctantly enforced necessity by the war adversary, which they actually do not want and therefore present as a turning point in their policy, that this is a hypocrisy staged for their citizens, can already be seen from this, that it is the same states and their political leaders on all sides of the conflict who have acquired and regularly modernised all the military means they need for precisely these cases in the most peaceful times, i.e. who count on these wars and their orgies of violence as a permanently possible case of their policy, and who therefore have them at the ready from one day to the next. The staging of the response to war with war presented as the new standpoint of their state in matters of war is made for the state audience so that they will go along with the bellicose standpoint of their state as a forced conversion of their actually peaceful state into a war, so that they will thus see the war of their state as a deviation from their substantially anti-war political standpoint and thus see the other state as the culprit in this war and are supposed to follow their own therefore as war actors forced into war.

The fact that the citizens mobilised with this hypocrisy of a turning point in time, whether they see their state’s war as being imposed by the other side’s war and have identified the other as the guilty party in the war or not, that these citizens could still have the problem that advocating their state’s war costs them their existence, this option of citizens in matters of war is not unfamiliar to states and that is why citizens are not asked whether they want a war or not, but are forced to go to war. 

And it is this rectification of citizens at war, brought about by state force, that reveals something about the raison d’état  of these citizen societies and their state.

For the politicians of the states of these citizen societies on both sides of the war, this is actually not coercion at all, but rather, in their image of the relationship between state and citizens, only the execution of a rectification for the citizens who have doubts about the war because it is costing them their lives, a rectification of this relationship between citizens and state that the latter, in their understandable fears, do not want to acknowledge. From the point of view of the political leaders of these states of citizen societies, the rectification of this relationship consists in the fact that these citizen societies are not citizen societies without their state, so wars defend the existence of citizen societies. This argumentation with the assumed equation of the existence of states and its citizens, based on the actual reality of state-civic life made real by state violence, that is without state no life, reveals the real existing totalitarianism that states impose on their citizens: without state no human existence – the political power of citizen societies does not only see itself as the condition of the existence of human beings and therefore treats the surrender of the lives of citizens for the political programme of their political rule as the elementary content of the raison d’état  of these political bodies of citizen societies and this not only in war. In wars, this totalitarianism is unequivocal. Whether this is otherwise different when states in peacetime allow citizens to pursue their interests and  states regulate this pursuit of interests, can be checked by anyone by looking at how this state-regulated pursuit of citizen’s interests practically work and what comes out of it in terms of the achievements of interests for the citizens on one side and for their state on the other side. The fact that the state of these citizen societies concedes to citizens the pursuit of their private life interests should not blind anyone to the fact that it only does so when the pursuit of these interests benefits the state and that for this concession it demands the price that citizens sacrifice their lives for the defence of their guarantor of freedom when its existence is called into question by its peers, by other states.

The highly praised civilisational progress from feudal rule and its absolutist subordination of its society members to this feudal rule towards the recognition of the existence of citizens and their interests in citizen societies by their states thus remains within rather modest limits. So much about the pleonasm of fascist states or, and about – which is the same thing – the difference between fascism and democracy.






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